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Abstract
Credit risk may be warehoused by choice, or because of limited hedging
possibilities. Credit risk warehousing increases capital requirements and
leaves open risk. Open risk must be priced in the physical measure, rather
than the risk neutral measure, and implies profits and losses. Furthermore
the rate of return on capital that shareholders require must be paid from
profits. Profits are taxable and losses provide tax credits. Here we extend
the semi-replication approach of Burgard and Kjaer (2013) and the capital
formalism (KVA) of Green, Kenyon, and Dennis (2014) to cover credit risk
warehousing and tax, formalized as double-semi-replication and TVA (Tax
Valuation Adjustment) to enable quantification.
1 Introduction
Credit valuation adjustments (CVA) apply to all counterparties with derivatives
transactions that are marked to market, that is, those in the Trading Book. For
most banks only a subset of these counterparties have liquid CDS contracts
available for hedging default risk, so some credit risk is inevitably warehoused.
Increased credit risk requires increased capital. Open risk requires pricing in
the physical measure rather than the risk neutral measure.
Here we extend the semi-replication approach in Burgard and Kjaer [2013]
and Green, Kenyon, and Dennis [2014] to include counterparty credit risk ware-
housing and taxation of any resultant profit or loss. Thus we introduce double-
semi-replication, that is, partial hedging of value jump on counterparty default,
and Tax Valuation Adjustment(TVA).
Credit risk also affects the capital a bank is required to hold and we include
this interaction. In addition shareholders, and bank executives, require a re-
turn on this deployed capital, which we have previously formalized within KVA
Green et al. [2014]. Paying a return on capital requires profits and so we include
the taxation of these profits within our double-semi-replication approach.
∗The views expressed are those of the authors only, no other representation
should be attributed. The authors are not tax experts and this does not constitute
tax advice of any kind. Not guaranteed fit for any purpose. Use at your own risk.
†Contact: chris.kenyon@lloydsbanking.com
‡Contact: andrew.green2@lloydsbanking.com
1
1.1 Limits of CVA Hedging
The USD denominated liquid CDS market contains only around 1600 names.
Banks typically have thousands to tens of thousands of counterparties so rela-
tively few will be present in the liquid CDS market. Outside the USD market
there are relatively few liquid CDS contracts. CDS markets, even when nomi-
nally liquid, may be shallow Carver [2013] making pricing using observed spreads
problematic and hedging challenging.
Some desks may warehouse CVA risk by choice. The pricing effect w.r.t.
the bank is the same as though the warehousing was driven by lack of liquid
CDS, except that there may be better data to estimate hazard rates. Risk must
be priced in otherwise pricing will be inconsistent with the risk appetite of the
bank. Here we capture this risk appetite using a market price of jump risk
Antje et al. [2005], Berg [2010], which can be calibrated to the bank price of
jump risk. Depending on the sign of the price of jump risk this may be higher
or lower than the price of fully hedged CVA.
Computing market-implied hazard rates from CDS spreads is problematic
because credit protection also confers capital relief which may be priced in
Kenyon and Green [2013]. Thus CDS spreads can only be used to obtain bounds
on market-implied hazard rates. However, by Regulation, observed CDS spreads
must be used for computing CVA VAR capital further complicating the picture.
1.2 Taxation and TVA
Whilst default has been widely considered in the derivatives literature, tax has
so far been almost absent outside Corporate Finance and the Banking Book
(Kenyon and Kenyon [2013] is one exception). Tax is potentially present when-
ever there is a profit or loss so when a derivative is perfectly hedged tax can be
ignored. However, as has been demonstrated above, CVA trading desks cannot
in practice hedge all of their default risk and as a consequence profits and losses
must occur. Profits are taxable and losses create so-called tax shields. Here we
formalize a Tax Valuation Adjustment (TVA1) to quantify these effects when
hedging is not perfect.
TVA is the valuation adjustment that formalizes the effect of tax on profits
and losses. That is, if a return on capital is required by shareholders then this
must be paid out of profits, and profits in this instance are after-tax. Thus we
must allow for tax when calculating the price required for a derivatives such that
we can pay shareholders for capital. Equally, when the bank has expected losses
from counterparty jump to default because of limited hedging then the bank will
require compensation in order to do the trade. We choose this compensation
to be equal in physical-measure expectation to the expected unhedged losses.
Now, whilst the counterparty has not defaulted this cashflow stream may be
regarded as profit by the tax authority. If the counterparty defaults then there
will also be a tax consequence on the default date. Default losses will provide a
tax credit that will offset the previous tax costs on these profits.
1TVA has been used before in XVA as “Total Valuation Adjustment”, but given that both
KVA and Tax effects were not included we are reusing the acronym.
2
1.3 Capital
Shareholders, and bank executives, require a return on deployed capital. This
return is paid out of profits and hence is subject to taxation. There is a whole
literature on methods to return profits to shareholders using share buy-backs or
dividends. These methods have different tax consequences to the shareholders
and hence are out of scope here. We focus on the tax consequences to the bank
of profits to pay the return on capital, as well as from the profits and losses
because of partial hedging of jump to default credit risk.
1.4 CVA Hedging and CVA Regulatory Capital
Under Basel III BCBS-189 [2011] capital relief is granted for CVA hedging using
single name and index CDS under both standard and advanced calculation
methods. If a CDS is eligible as a hedge under regulatory capital rules and the
CVA trading desk chooses not to fully hedge the default risk then the capital
requirement will be higher than it would otherwise be. This clearly has direct
implications for KVA. Here we establish the relationship between CVA risk
warehousing, KVA and TVA.
2 Warehousing CVA Risk and Double Semi-Replication
We extend the semi-replication arguments of Burgard and Kjaer [2013] and
Green, Kenyon, and Dennis [2014] to double semi-replication to take account
of partial hedging of counterparty default, i.e. risk warehousing. Thus we
cover credit, funding, and capital. For clarity we introduce Tax in the following
section. Notation is the same as Green, Kenyon, and Dennis [2014] with some
additions (see Table 1). The sign convention is that the value of a cash amount is
positive if received by the issuer. The aim is to find the economic or shareholder
value of the derivative portfolio, Vˆ . Note that here, as in Burgard and Kjaer
[2013] and Green, Kenyon, and Dennis [2014], we neglect balance sheet feedback
effects.
The derivation follows Green, Kenyon, and Dennis [2014] with modifications
for risk warehousing and the capital treatment of CVA hedges. The dynamics
of the underlying assets are
dS =µsSdt+ σsSdW (1)
dPC =rCPCdt− PCdJC (2)
dPi =riPidt− (1 −Ri)PidJB for i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
On default of the issuer, B, and the counterparty, C, the value of the derivative
takes the following values
V̂ (t, S, 1, 0) =gB(MB, X) (4)
V̂ (t, S, 0, 1) =gC(MC , X), (5)
where the two g functions allow a degree of flexibility to be included in the
model around the value of the derivative after default. The usual assumption is
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Parameter Description
V̂ (t, S) The economic value of the derivative or derivative portfolio
V The risk-free value of the derivative or derivative portfolio
U The valuation adjustment
X Collateral
K;KU ;KR Total Capital Requirement; Unhedged Capital Requirement; Capital
Relief from full CDS hedging
E Cash flow liable to tax as a function of time
Π Replicating portfolio
S Underlying stock
µS Stock drift
σS Stock volatility
PC Counterparty Bond (zero recovery)
P1; P2 Issuer bond with recovery R1; recovery R2, note R1 6= R2
dβ¯S; dβ¯C ; dβ¯X ; dβ¯K ; dβ¯E Growth in the cash account associated with stock; counterparty bond;
collateral; capital; tax. All prior to rebalancing.
r; rC ; ri; rX ; rF Risk-free rate; Yield on counterparty bond; issuer bond; collateral; is-
suer bond (one-bond case)
MB ; MC Close-out value on issuer default; Counterparty default
αC ;αi Holding of counterparty bonds with full hedge (ψ = 1); issuer bond
δ The stock position
γS Stock dividend yield
qS ; qC Stock repo rate; counterparty bond repo rate
JC ; JB Default indicator for counterparty; issuer
gB; gC Value of the derivative portfolio after issuer default; counterparty de-
fault
Ri; RC Recovery on issuer bond i; counterparty derivative portfolio
λC ; λ
P
C ; λ˜C ; λB Effective financing rate of counterparty bond λC = rC − r = rC − qC ;
Physical measure hazard rate for counterparty C; Effective hazard rate
under semi-replication; Spread of a zero-recovery zero-coupon issuer
bond. For bonds with recovery the following relation holds (1−Ri)λB =
ri − r for i ∈ {1, 2}
sF ; sX Funding spread in one bond case sF = rF − r; spread on collateral
γK(t) The cost of capital (the assets comprising the capital may themselves
have a dividend yield and this can be incorporated into γK(t))
γE(t) The effective tax rate
∆V̂B; ∆V̂C Change in value of derivative on issuer default; on counterparty default
∆E; ∆¯E Tax effect on counterparty default; Tax effect on counterparty default
when ψ = 0
ǫB ; ǫC Hedging error on default of issuer. Sometimes split into terms inde-
pendent of and dependent on capital ǫB = ǫB0 + ǫBK ; hedging error on
counterparty default
P P = α1P1+α2P2 is the value of the own bond portfolio prior to default
PD PD = α1R1P1 + α2R2P2 is the value of the own bond portfolio after
default
φ Fraction of capital available for derivative funding
ψ Fraction of counterparty bond PC used in the hedge portfolio relative
to full hedge
ΓC Compensator of the counterparty jump
mλC Market price of default risk for C
Table 1: A summary of the notation, this is the same as Burgard and Kjaer
(2013) and Green, Kenyon and Dennis (2014) apart from extensions.
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that
gB =(V −X)
+ +RB(V −X)
− +X
gC =RC(V −X)
+ + (V −X)− +X, (6)
where x+ = max{x, 0} and x− = min{x, 0}.
We assume the funding condition (also known as the value equation in Duffie
[2001]) for V̂ :
V̂ −X + α1P1 + α2P2 − φK = 0, (7)
where φK represents the potential use of capital to offset funding requirements.
The growth in the cash account positions (gain equations in Duffie [2001]) as-
sociated with the stock and collateral (prior to rebalancing) are
dβ¯S =δ(γS − qS)Sdt (8)
dβ¯X =− rXXdt. (9)
We assume, as in Burgard and Kjaer [2013] that the stock is funded by putting
it in repo so that we only have dividend and borrow terms in dβ¯S . Note that
gains come only from changes in the underlyings, e.g. interest on cash accounts,
or dividends and borrow costs in repo, as the portfolio is self-financing (using
the definition of self-financing from Duffie [2001]).
The growth in the cash account, i.e. its gain equation, associated with the
counterparty bond is now given by
dβ¯C = −ψαCqCPCdt− ΓCdt. (10)
Note that we assume that the counterparty bond can be repo’d so we only have
to pay the borrow cost qC , as before. Comparing this with the same expression
in Burgard and Kjaer [2013] and Green, Kenyon, and Dennis [2014] shows two
changes:
• The bond holding is now ψαC where ψ ∈ [0, 1] reflects the fact that the
hedge position will in general be partial. αC is the bond holding with a
full hedge of the counterparty risk as previously.
• A new term, ΓC has been introduced. This is the compensator for the
losses that will now occur due to counterparty default when ψ 6= 1. This
is the cashflow the bank requires to compensate for having a (partially)
open risk position. However, we leave the form of ΓC unspecified for now.
The degree of counterparty risk hedging is driven by ψ where
ψ = 1 =⇒ semi-replication
ψ = 0 =⇒ unhedged, i.e. risk is warehoused
The growth in the cash account (gain equation Duffie [2001]) associated with
capital is also modified,
dβ¯K = −γK(K
U − ψKR)dt. (11)
Here KU represents the capital requirement should no CVA hedging be per-
formed. The capital relief associated with 100% CVA hedging is given by KR.
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CVA VAR capital can be zero with allowable credit hedges. However, when CDS
are used, counterparty credit risk capital requirements are determined by the
creditworthiness of the CDS provider (assuming this is better than the reference
entity). Delta hedging credit risk does not give a zero capital requirement for
the same reason. We make the assumption that hedging through the counter-
party bond PC is allowable for capital relief purposes in the CVA capital term
under Basel III BCBS-189 [2011]. Further discussion on the general form of this
term can be found in Green et al. [2014].
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma the change in the value of the derivative portfolio is
dVˆ =
∂V̂
∂t
dt+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2V̂
∂S2
dt+
∂V̂
∂S
dS +∆V̂BdJB +∆V̂CdJC . (12)
Assuming the portfolio, Π, is self-financing i.e. its change in value comes only
from gains in underlyings (stock, cash accounts, or bonds), gives
dΠ =δdS + δ(γS − qS)Sdt+ α1dP1 + α2dP2 + α
H
C dPC
− αHC qCPCdt− rXXdt− γK(K
U − ψKR)dt− ΓCdt.
(13)
Adding the derivative and replicating portfolio together we obtain
dVˆ + dΠ =
[
∂V̂
∂t
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2V̂
∂S2
+ δ(γS − qS)S + α1r1P1 + α2r2P2
+ αHC rCPC − α
H
C qCPC − rXX − γK(K
U − ψKR)− ΓC
]
dt (14)
+ ǫBdJB + ǫCdJC
+
[
δ +
∂V̂
∂S
]
dS,
where ǫB is the hedge error on the default of the issuer and ǫC is the hedge error
on the default of the counterparty.
Assuming replication of the derivative by the hedging portfolio, except on
issuer or counterparty default gives,
dVˆ + dΠ = 0. (15)
The delta risk is eliminated as usual,
δ = −
∂Vˆ
∂S
. (16)
The hedging error on issuer default takes the same form as in Green, Kenyon, and Dennis
[2014] except that the capital relief has now been specified explicitly,
ǫB =
[
∆VˆB − (P − PD)
]
(17)
=gB −X + PD − φ(K
U − ψKR)
=ǫB0 + ǫBK
In the final line the hedging error has been split into a term which does not
depend on capital, ǫB0 and a term which does depend on capital ǫBK . Note
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that ǫBK 6= −φ(K
U − ψKR) as the bond position is itself dependent on capital
through the funding requirements as defined by equation (7). The hedging error
on counterparty default is given by
ǫC =∆VˆC − ψαCPC (18)
=gC − Vˆ − ψαCPC
=(1− ψ)(gC − Vˆ ),
where we have used the fact that the original counterparty hedge was sized to
remove all counterparty risk and hence αCPC = gC − Vˆ .
We have not eliminated all sources of risk and hence we must choose how to
deal with the residual risk to counterparty default. That is, what compensation
does the bank require for running a partially open position? There are many
possibilities and we have chosen to price in the expected cost under the physical
measure P, i.e.
ΓC =− E
P
t [ǫCdJC ] ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] (19)
=− (1− ψ)(gC − V̂ )λ
P
C ,
where λP
C
is the hazard rate under the physical measure and hence is the in-
stantaneous probability of a jump in this measure.
The hazard rate in the risk-neutral measure is λC and, as with Burgard and Kjaer
[2013], we make the assumption that the counterparty bond can be repo’d at
close to the risk-free rate and hence,
λC = rC − qC . (20)
Furthermore we know that λC must contain a market price of risk, mλC with
respect to the physical probability of default and so,
λPC =λC −mλC (21)
=λC(1− ξ)
In general mλC may be rating (or level) dependent Hull et al. [2004]. Hence we
have the following PDE for Vˆ under double semi-replication,
0 =
∂V̂
∂t
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2V̂
∂S2
− (γS − qS)S
∂V̂
∂S
− (r + λB + λ˜C)V̂
+ λ˜CgC + λBgB − ǫBλB − sXX − γK(K
U − ψKR) + rφ(KU − ψKR)
Vˆ (T, S) = H(S). (22)
where the bond funding equation (7) has been used along with the yield of the
issued bond, ri = r + (1 − Ri)λB and the definition of ǫB in equation (17) to
derive the result,
α1r1P1 + α2r2P2 = rX − (r + λB)Vˆ − λB(ǫB − gB) + rφ(K
U − ψKR), (23)
and we have defined λ˜C as
λ˜C = ψλC + (1− ψ)(1 − ξ)λC . (24)
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λ˜C is the effective hazard rate in the presence of semi-replication of the coun-
terpary risk. Equation (24) shows that in the limits of full hedging and no
hedging,
ψ =1 λ˜C = λC
ψ =0 λ˜C = λ
P
C .
The PDE (22) has exactly the same structure as in Green, Kenyon, and Dennis
[2014] so writing Vˆ = V +U where V satisfies the Black-Scholes equation allows
a PDE to be written for U , the valuation adjustment,
∂U
∂t
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2U
∂S2
− (γS − qS)S
∂U
∂S
− (r + λB + λ˜C)U =
V λ˜C − gC λ˜C + V λB − gBλB + ǫBλB + sXX + (γK − rφ)(K
U − ψKR)
U(T, S) = 0 (25)
Applying the Feynman-Kac theorem gives,
U = CVA+DVA+ FCA+ COLVA+KVA, (26)
where
CVA =−
∫ T
t
λ˜C(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt [V (u)− gC(V (u), X(u))] du
(27)
DVA =−
∫ T
t
λB(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt [V (u)− gB(V (u), X(u))] du
(28)
FCA =−
∫ T
t
λB(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt [ǫB0(u)] du (29)
COLVA =−
∫ T
t
sX(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt [X(u)] du (30)
KVA =−
∫ T
t
e−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))ds
× Et
[
(γK(u)− r(u)φ)(K
U − ψKR)(u) + λBǫBK (u)
]
du, (31)
which, unsurprisingly, is identical with Green, Kenyon, and Dennis [2014], aside
from the replacement of λC with the effective hazard rate λ˜C and the explicit
capital relief from hedging the CVA. Note that complete credit hedging removes
the CVA VAR capital requirement, but only changes the counterparty capital
requirement to that for the provider of the credit hedge (if this is better rated).
If the market price of risk is positive so that the market implied probability
of default is higher that that in the physical measure, λ˜C < λC and the CVA will
be lower using this model, although the conditioning effect through e−
∫
u
t
λ˜C(s))ds
in DVA, FCA, and COLVA will make these terms larger. The KVA term will
increase because of the reduced CVA hedging benefit and because of the reduced
conditioning effect.
Since we have unhedged individual cashflows (although included via expec-
tation) the portfolio V̂ + Π will show profits and losses. We now turn to the
potential tax consequences of these, and of the profits paying the return on
capital.
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3 Tax Consequences and TVA
The (possibly forced) choice to risk warehouse some fraction of the counterparty
default risk means that there is a jump in value on counterparty default, and
that there will be compensatory accruals prior to default. These effects lead to
profits and losses which are taxable. Profits to pay shareholders’ (or executives’)
required return on capital in KVA will also be subject to tax. To cater for
Taxation we extend the double semi-replication model above. This leads to
the introduction of a further valuation adjustment in XVA, TVA, Taxation
Valuation Adjustment.
We apply a single effective tax rate to profits or losses as they occur so that
tax losses lead to tax credits. We assume that the bank has sufficient profits
that any tax credits can be used. The possibility of not using tax credits over
an extended period is considered to be part of the bank default probability.
To add taxation to the replication portfolio we introduce a further cash
account associated with tax. It has two terms, reflecting the tax rate paid on
the tax liability and the tax effect on counterparty default (prior to rebalancing).
dβ¯E = −γE(t)E(t)dt +∆EdJC , (32)
Again here there is no term in dJB as we assume tax effects on own default
are incorporated into the recovery rate RB. Note that this account has two
underlyings: a tax liability (or credit)E(t) on non-jump times; and a tax liability
(or credit) effect at counterparty default.
The change in the replicating portfolio is now given by,
dΠ =δdS + δ(γS − qS)Sdt+ α1dP1 + α2dP2 + ψαCdPC − ψαCqCPCdt
− rXXdt− γK(K
U − ψKR)dt− ΓCdt− γE(t)Edt +∆EdJC .
(33)
Combining the change in the derivative, which is unchanged, with equation (33)
gives,
dV̂ + dΠ =
[
∂V̂
∂t
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2V̂
∂S2
+ δ(γS − qS)S + α1r1P1 + α2r2P2
+ ψαCrCPC − ψαCqCPC − rXX − γK(K
U − ψKR)− ΓC − γE(t)E
]
dt
(34)
+ ǫBdJB + ǫCdJC
+
[
δ +
∂V̂
∂S
]
dS,
where the hedging error on own default is unchanged but the hedging error on
counterparty default is given by
ǫC =∆V̂C − ψαCPC +∆E (35)
=(1 − ψ)(gC − V̂ + ∆¯E),
where we have assumed that the tax effect on default of the counterparty scales
linearly with the proportion of hedging ∆E = (1− ψ)∆¯E .
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As in equation (19) we choose the compensator to match the expected cost
of counterparty default in the physical measure,
ΓC = −(1− ψ)(gC − V̂ + ∆¯E)λC(1 − ξ). (36)
Hence the PDE for Vˆ becomes,
0 =
∂V̂
∂t
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2V̂
∂S2
− (γS − qS)S
∂V̂
∂S
− (r + λB + λ˜C)V̂
+ λ˜CgC + λBgB − ǫBλB − sXX − (γK − rφ)(K
U − ψKR)
− γE(t)E − λC(1− ξ)(1 − ψ)∆¯E
V̂ (T, S) = H(S). (37)
Finally the PDE for U becomes,
∂U
∂t
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2U
∂S2
− (γS − qS)S
∂U
∂S
− (r + λB + λ˜C)U =
V λ˜C − gC λ˜C + V λB − gBλB + ǫBλB + sXX + (γK − rφ)(K
U − ψKR)
− γE(t)E − λC(1− ξ)(1 − ψ)∆¯E
U(T, S) = 0 (38)
Again applying the Feynman-Kac theorem yields,
U = CVA+DVA+ FCA+ COLVA+KVA+TVA, (39)
where
CVA =−
∫ T
t
λ˜C(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt [V (u)− gC(V (u), X(u))] du
(40)
DVA =−
∫ T
t
λB(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt [V (u)− gB(V (u), X(u))] du
(41)
FCA =−
∫ T
t
λB(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt [ǫB0(u)] du (42)
COLVA =−
∫ T
t
sX(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt [X(u)] du (43)
KVA =−
∫ T
t
e−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))ds
× Et
[
(γK(u)− r(u)φ)(K
U − ψKR)(u) + λBǫBK (u)
]
du (44)
TVA =−
∫ T
t
e−
∫
u
t
(r(s)+λB(s)+λ˜C(s))ds
× Et
[
γE(t)E + λC(1− ξ)(1 − ψ)∆¯E
]
du (45)
Capital terms are specified by capital Regulations, similarly tax terms are spec-
ified by tax Laws. Tax terms at non-jump times and on counterparty default
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are the direct result of profits and losses, so2:
E = γK(u)(K
U − ψKR)(u) + IBλB(ǫBK (u) + ǫB0(u)), (46)
∆¯E = − γE(u) (V (u)− gC(V (u), X(u))) (47)
The TVA term itself states that more profits must be made so that, after paying
tax, the required return on capital to shareholders can be met. It also states
that more profits must be made so that the required return on open risk can be
made by the bank (according to the choice of compensator Γ). An alternative
way of looking at the TVA term is that it states that the value to shareholders
of V̂ is reduced because taxes must be paid.
• Equation 46 states that profits to pay for capital are taxed. Note that the
source of the profit (whether it comes from returns on existing capital or
not) is irrelevant, hence the −r(u)φ term is not present.
• The indicators IB in Equation 46 describe the choice of the tax authority
on cashflows accrued relative to own-default. If the tax authority follows
the accounting treatment of, say, FAS157 or IFRS13 that the correct price
(from the point of view of the tax authority) includes own-creditworthiness
then IB = 1, otherwise IB = 0. In other words, does the tax authority tax
the accruals that cancel out PnL bleed? That is, does the tax authority
look on the bank as a going concern (so chooses IB = 0)?
• Equation 47 states that the bank requires compensation for the expected
tax effects of the value jump on counterparty default. This term could,
alternatively, be included in the CVA term.
Hence a new valuation adjustment, TVA, has now been added to the existing
set of adjustments present earlier under semi-replication.
4 Numerical Examples
Here we provide examples based on 10Y GBP interest rate swaps (IRS) to
demonstrate the effect of risk warehousing on valuation adjustments, and to
show the magnitude of tax valuation adjustments. We follow ’strategy 1’ in
Burgard and Kjaer [2013] so that there is no shortfall on own default but any
potential windfall after default is not monetized, i.e. the spread between the
2The authors are not tax experts so this is for illustration only.
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two own bonds is not exploited. Equations 40–45 specialize to:
CVA =− (1−RC)
∫ T
t
λ˜C(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt
[
e−
∫
u
t
(r(s)dsV (u)+
]
du
(48)
DVA =− (1−RB)
∫ T
t
λB(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt
[
e−
∫
u
t
(r(s)dsV (u)−
]
du
(49)
FCA =− (1−RB)
∫ T
t
λB(u)e
−
∫
u
t
(λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt
[
e−
∫
u
t
(r(s)dsV (u)+
]
du
(50)
KVA =−
∫ T
t
e−
∫
u
t
(λB(s)+λ˜C(s))ds
× Et
[
e−
∫
u
t
(r(s)ds(γK(u)− r(u)φ)(K
U − ψKR)(u)
]
du (51)
TVA =−
∫ T
t
e−
∫
u
t
(λB(s)+λ˜C(s))dsEt
[
e−
∫
u
t
(r(s)ds
γE(u)
(
γK(u)(K
U − ψKR)(u)− λC(1 −RC)(1− ξ)(1 − ψ)V (u)
+
)]
du
(52)
Since we use interest rate swaps we have stochastic interest rates and so the r(u)
discounting is within the expectations. The derivation follows the same steps
as for derivatives of stock prices (see Green et al. [2014] for the KVA case).
The 10Y GBP swaps have semi-annual payment schedules and fixed rate of
2.7%. Issuer credit spread is flat 100bps with 40% recovery. We assume there is
no capital priced in to the credit spread. Counterparty data is shown in Table
2.
Capital requirements are as in Green et al. [2014]: we use the standardised
approach for Market Risk capital ; current exposure method for Exposure at
Default in Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) capital with standardised approach
for weights; CVA VAR capital uses standardized approach with the approxima-
tion for large numbers of counterparties. Cost of capital, γK , is set at 10% and
minimum capital 8%.
Tax rate, γE , is set to 21% and applied to cash flows as they occur, including
counterparty default.
Counterparty
Rating
CDS (bp) Standardized
Risk Weight
CVA Risk
Weight wi
AAA 30 20% 0.7%
A 75 50% 0.8%
BB 250 100% 2%
CCC 750 150% 10%
Table 2: Counterparty data for the examples.
Base Case: back-to-back IRS with CCDS on uncollateralized side
Base case is a pair of back-to-back 10Y GBP IRS, one fully collateralized and
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the other uncollateralized. We assume that a (fully collateralized) CCDS is
available to perfectly credit hedge the uncollateralized IRS and that the CVA
charge is used to purchase it. The CCDS is a contingent credit default swap
that perfectly matches the exposure of the uncollateralized IRS under all states
of the world up to maturity of the IRS. The exposure of the uncollateralized
IRS is the value multiplied by the loss given default. Thus we have a perfect
credit protection instrument, but this does not reduce CCR capital to zero it
just switches to calculation to the rating of the CDS seller.
Credit Hedge φ c/p CVA DVA FCA KVA TVA Total
Source ψ mλC Rating MR CCR CVA
A 1 na 0 AAA -4 39 -14 0 -3 0 -1 17
A 1 na 0 A -10 38 -14 0 -8 0 -2 5
A 1 na 0 BB -31 33 -12 0 -7 0 -1 -18
A 1 na 0 CCC -68 24 -9 0 -5 0 -1 -60
A 1 na 1 AAA -4 39 -14 0 -2 0 0 19
A 1 na 1 A -10 38 -14 0 -4 0 -1 9
A 1 na 1 BB -31 33 -12 0 -4 0 -1 -14
A 1 na 1 CCC -68 24 -9 0 -3 0 -1 -57
Table 3: Base case: back to back 10Y GBP interest rate PAY swaps with
different counterparties, one side collateralized the other uncollateralized; with
exact credit hedge (ψ = 1) on uncollateralized side. φ states whether income on
capital is included in the cost of capital. Values for XVA are bps of notional.
The valuation adjustments are shown in Table 3 for a range of counterparty
ratings for the uncollateralized side. In particular:
• zero Market Risk capital cost because the IRS are back-to-back
• zero CVA VAR capital cost because we are collateralized on one side and
have credit protection from the CCDS on the other
• tax cost is close to zero because the capital costs are low and there is no
value jump on counterparty default
• sign of the total XVA adjustment changes from positive to negative with
increasing riskiness of counterparty
Cases with warehoused credit risk are shown in Table 5 and Table 4 when
there is no credit hedge on the uncollateralized side of the back-to-back IRS
swaps. Table 4 shows results with a positive market price of risk, e.g. during
or shortly after a period of perceived high credit risk, so the market-implied
hazard rate is higher than the physical-measure hazard rate. Table 5 shows the
opposite situation, e.g. after a long period of perceived low credit risk.
Effect of Risk Warehousing We can observe the following points:
• CVA, DVA, and FCA change by roughly 50%–25% relative to the base
case. The direction depends on the sign of the market price of default
risk as it expresses the difference between the risk-neutral and physical
measure hazard rates
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• CCR capital costs roughly double because there is no credit protection
• CVA VAR capital costs appear and vary by up to roughly 25% depending
on the sign of the market price of default risk
Effects of Tax Tax effects are highly dependent on the sign of the market
price of credit risk. This is because there is an opposition between tax effects
on counterparty default and tax effects of capital. This opposition is almost
balanced here when the market is underestimating the physical probability of
default, i.e. negative market price of jump to default risk. When the market
overestimates the hazard rate then there is relatively little tax gain from any
losses on counterparty default. The opposite is true when the market underes-
timates the hazard rate.
All effects are reduced when income from capital is used to reduce the cost
of capital. Note that tax is taken from the whole cost of capital as the source
of the profits is irrelevant to the tax authority.
Market price of jump to default risk We have considered positive and
negative market prices of jump to default risk, mλC . However, if capital relief is
priced into observed CDS spreads this will mimic the effect of a positive mλC .
This suggests a future systematic bias towards (effective) positive prices mλC .
In our examples it would be very roughly 0.5.
Credit Hedge φ c/p CVA DVA FCA KVA TVA Total
Source ψ mλC Rating MR CCR CVA
A 0 0.5 0 AAA -2 40 -14 0 -3 -9 -2 10
A 0 0.5 0 A -5 39 -14 0 -8 -10 -3 0
A 0 0.5 0 BB -17 37 -13 0 -15 -23 -4 -36
A 0 0.5 0 CCC -43 31 -11 0 -19 -103 -17 -162
A 0 0.5 1 AAA -2 40 -14 0 -2 -6 -1 14
A 0 0.5 1 A -5 39 -14 0 -4 -7 -1 8
A 0 0.5 1 BB -17 37 -13 0 -8 -16 -2 -19
A 0 0.5 1 CCC -43 31 -11 0 -10 -74 -9 -116
Table 4: No credit hedge, and positive market price of risk, e.g. during or
shortly after a period of perceived high credit risk. φ states whether income on
capital is included in the cost of capital. Values for XVA are bps of notional.
5 Conclusions
Limited CDS markets naturally restrict the ability to obtain credit protection
and force institutions to warehouse credit risk. This will produce profits and
losses which may be taxable. In addition the profits to pay the return on
capital to shareholders may be taxable. Thus we have introduced double-semi-
replication to tackle limited credit protection and a Tax Valuation Adjustment
to formalize tax effects. We find highly significant effects of warehousing credit
risk on existing XVA elements and on TVA. These effects are dominated by the
sign of the market price of jump to default risk. This sign may have a systematic
positive bias, i.e. towards increased market implied hazard rates in as much as
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Credit Hedge φ c/p CVA DVA FCA KVA TVA Total
Source ψ mλC Rating MR CCR CVA
A 0 -0.5 0 AAA -6 39 -14 0 -3 -8 -1 6
A 0 -0.5 0 A -15 37 -13 0 -7 -9 0 -9
A 0 -0.5 0 BB -43 31 -11 0 -13 -21 2 -55
A 0 -0.5 0 CCC -84 19 -7 0 -13 -75 -1 -161
A 0 -0.5 1 AAA -6 39 -14 0 -2 -6 0 11
A 0 -0.5 1 A -15 37 -13 0 -4 -7 1 -1
A 0 -0.5 1 BB -43 31 -11 0 -7 -15 4 -40
A 0 -0.5 1 CCC -84 19 -7 0 -7 -55 5 -130
Table 5: No credit hedge, and negative market price of risk, e.g. after a long pe-
riod of low perceived credit risk. φ states whether income on capital is included
in the cost of capital. Values for XVA are bps of notional.
capital relief is priced in to CDS spreads. A positive market price of default risk
means that CVA, DVA, and FCA are generally reduced but the capital and tax
elements are increased because there is less actual probability of default.
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